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SHADOW OF A BULLDOZER?: RLUIPA AND
EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO
G. David Mathues*
INTRODUCTION
According to the Gospel of Matthew, the local tax collectors once
asked Peter whether or not Jesus paid the temple tax.' Peter an-
swered in the affirmative-without talking to Jesus. Later that day,
Jesus suggested that He should not have to pay. But He then in-
structed Peter to go fishing, take the coin from the mouth of the first
fish he caught, and use it to pay both of their taxes, so that they would
"not offend" the tax authorities. 2
Modern church 3 leaders may find the story proverbial. Although
churches are exempt from property taxes, church leaders' relation-
ships with land use authorities would be more amicable if the
churches paid. But since the coin-filled fish is a rare species, there has
been no shortage of "offense" between churches and governments
seeking tax revenues. This Note considers the clash between the two
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New
London.4
Kelo held that governments may seize unblighted, private prop-
erty through eminent domain and then give the property to another
private party without violating the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.A., History, Bob
Jones University, 2004. I dedicate this Note to the pantheon of teachers under whose
instruction I have been blessed to sit. Special thanks go to Professor Richard Garnett,
who provided inspiration and advice about this subject, and to Drs. Ronald Horton




3 As used throughout this Note, the word "church" is synonymous with the term
"religious assembly" and should not be construed to signify any specific faith, sect, or
denomination. The building may be a church, cathedral, synagogue, temple, or
mosque. The sign out front does not matter so long as the congregation is gathering
there to worship.
4 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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Amendment if the transfer furthers economic development. 5 The
case forged odd alliances 6 and set off "a firestorm of criticism crossing
partisan lines."'7 Church leaders claimed that the ruling threatened
them in a special way because in the rush for tax revenues,8 govern-
ments seeking increased revenue from economic development could,
and would, target tax-exempt religious land users first.9 One religious
liberty representative predicted that "'I[c]ity governments will be em-
boldened to some extent by the Court's decision, and may begin to
target church properties. "'10 An attorney for the Becket Fund for Re-
ligious Liberty warned ominously that "'this decision will inevitably
draw the bulldozers toward religious institutions first."'"1
5 Id. at 2668.
6 Amicus briefs on behalf of the homeowners were submitted by the NAACP, the
AARP, the Libertarian Party, and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty-unlikely,
although not unprecedented, allies, because while the former two tend to favor gov-
ernment intervention, the latter two tend to oppose it. See Brief for NAACP, AARP,
Hispanic Alliance of Atlantic County, Inc., Citizens in Action, Cramer Hill Resident
Ass'n, Inc., & the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057; Brief for the
Tidewater Libertarian Party as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803190; Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL
278141 [hereinafter Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty]. After the rul-
ing, a congressional response was cosponsored by the political odd couple of Repre-
sentatives Tom DeLay (R-TX) and Maxine Waters (D-CA). Joi Preciphs, Eminent-
Domain Ruling Knits Rivals, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2005, at 4A.
7 James W. Ely, Jr., "Poor Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing
Rights of Property Owners, 2005 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 39, 64. Even Justice Stevens, the
opinion's author, later said that his views on the condemnation's constitutionality
were "'entirely divorced"' from his view on its wisdom. Linda Greenhouse, Judge
Weighs Duty v. Desire (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
8 See Paul J. Weinberg, The First Church of Costco: Land Grab for Tax Revenue or
Preferential Treatment of Churches, 26 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. (West) 1, 3 (Mar. 2003)
(quoting University of Southern California Law Professor George Lefcoe, who be-
lieves that in many land use decisions, including those involving religious entities,
"'[t] he whole problem is that cities are in a mad race for revenues"').
9 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Ruling on Property Seizures Rallies Christian Groups,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A13; Jane Lampman, Property Rights: Not a Given for
Churches, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 2005, at 15 (describing apprehension by
religious organizations following oral argument in Kelo); Mark Stricherz, Court Deci-
sion Worries Churches, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 30, 2005, at 30.
10 Stricherz, supra note 9, at 30 (quoting Richard Hammar, Editor, Church Law &
Tax Report).
11 Kirkpatrick, supra note 9. The Becket Fund frequently represents churches in
land use conflicts and filed an amicus brief in Kelo. Brief for the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, supra note 6.
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A world where the government could seize church property
merely by asserting some nebulous economic benefit is troublesome.
Is this prospect realistic? Churches can seek refuge from condemna-
tion under unique constitutional and statutory provisions, so at first
glance it seems odd that churches would be uniquely vulnerable to
the bulldozers. Furthermore, given the prominence of faith in Ameri-
can life, targeting churches might not be politically feasible, even if it
is legal. 12 For these reasons, Columbia Law School Professor Thomas
Merrill believes that a fear of cities targeting church buildings is
'paranoid.' "13
Merrill may be right. Before Kelo, one city tried to take a
church's land but failed. In Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Rede-
velopment Corp.,14 an expanding church, needing a facility which
would accommodate all its members, spent five years assembling a
plot of land large enough for its needs.1 5 When the church applied
for a permit, the city said no, and then told the church it was imposing
a moratorium on building permits in the area.1 6 Yet during this sup-
posed moratorium, the city peddled the church's land to commercial
clients.' 7 Once Costco expressed interest in the property, the city
pressured the church to sell. The church refused.' 8 The city then
moved to condemn the church's property in order to give the land to
Costco, justifying its decision by the economic benefits Costco would
create. 1 9
12 While it might be politically impossible to target some churches, other
churches have been targeted by openly prejudiced land use authorities. See H.R. REP.
No. 106-219, at 18-24 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (providing extended catalogue of antire-
ligious discrimination by land use authorities). Nor was the discrimination limited to
the authorities themselves. In one hearing a witness pleaded to a zoning board, "Let's
keep these God-damned Pentecostals out of here"; in another an objector snarled
"Hitler should have killed more of you" at Jews seeking permission to open a syna-
gogue. Id.; see also Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 755, 755, 760 (1999) (describing land use regulation as "among the
most difficult issues facing religious liberty" and exposing its pernicious and dispro-
portionate impact on minority faiths).
13 Kirkpatrick, supra note 9.
14 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
15 Id. at 1212-14.
16 Id. at 1213; Deborah Baxtrom, Render unto Caesar, LIBERTY MAC., Jan.-Feb.
2003, at 19, 19.
17 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1213-14.
18 Id. at 1214.
19 Id. at 1215, 1227-29.
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A lengthy legal and public relations battle followed. 20 The
church leaders questioned the city's interest in tax revenue from land
that had lain vacant for almost a decade especially since the city was
enjoying a twenty-five percent budget surplus and further questioned
the city's good faith in shopping the land to Costco during the sup-
posed building moratorium. 21 City Councilmember Anna Piercy de-
fended the city, answering that the city did not object to the church,
so long as it did not "'tak[e] our prime development land."22
The church answered that the land belonged to the church, not
to the city, and that under the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) 23 the city could not take the land
and give it to Costco just because Costco would pay more taxes. The
court agreed with the church. It granted the church's motion for a
preliminary injunction and then denied the City's motion to dismiss.
24
The case settled soon afterwards. 2
5
Cottonwood is the only reported case where a government tried to
condemn religious property in the name of economic development.
The result should ease church leaders' fears. But some concern
might remain because Cottonwood was only a single district court case,
and it was decided before Kelo. Therefore, Cottonwoods continuing
significance might be open to question.
Furthermore, church leaders might wonder how frequently other
cities have tried to condemn religious property for economic reasons.
The Becket Fund's amicus brief in Kelo cited ten such incidents since
2000 alone.26 Following Kelo, Sand Springs, Oklahoma, attempted to
condemn the Centennial Baptist Church as part of the town's redevel-
opment program. 27 The church resisted and caught the attention of
20 For a longer discussion of the facts of the case, see generally STEVEN GREEN-
HUT, ABUSE OF POWER: How THE GOVERNMENT MISUSES EMINENT DOMAIN 160-77
(2004); Kevin M. Powers, The Sword and the Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle Ground of
Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 184-86 (2004); Baxtrom, supra note 16.
21 See Baxtrom, supra note 16, at 19.
22 Maggie Gallagher, Evicting the Lord, N.Y. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at 25 (emphasis
added).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
24 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
25 Powers, supra note 20, at 185. The church gave up its land to Costco, but
received a nearby and equally suitable plot instead.
26 Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 6, at 8 n.20.
27 Ralph Blumenthal, Humble Church Is at Center of Debate on Eminent Domain, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2006, at All.
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both the New York Times28 and the National Review.29 The controversy,
which a local paper has dubbed "'a battle between God Almighty and
the almighty dollar,"' 30 could, if unsettled, play out over several years
in a manner similar to Cottonwood.
The Becket Fund's brief and the Sand Springs incident demon-
strate that church leaders are not paranoid to fear that governments
may try to take church land for economic development; this Note asks
whether, in light of RLUIPA and Kelo, they are paranoid to fear that
the governments will succeed.
Because RLUIPA requires that the government show a compel-
ling interest before it enacts a "land use regulation" which substan-
tially burdens religious exercise, 3 ' this Note asks specifically if Kelo
made economic development a compelling government interest. Part
I lays the foundation for this question by examining the background
and substance of both RLUIPA and the Supreme Court's eminent do-
main decisions. Part II asks whether RLUIPA is applicable to eminent
domain proceedings and answers that RLUIPA does apply. Part III
asks whether economic development was a compelling interest suffi-
cient to overcome RLUIPA in any context, including eminent do-
main, before Kelo and concludes that economic development was
never compelling. Part IV asks if Kelo changes the existing law and
concludes that Kelo changes nothing. Therefore, this Note concludes
that RLUIPA prevents any government from taking a church's land
through eminent domain for the purpose of economic development.
Because of RLUIPA, church leaders should reduce their concerns
about Kelo.
I. BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANCE OF RLUIPA AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S EMINENT DOMAIN JURISPRUDENCE
A. Background to RLUIPA
On July 13, 2000, Senators Orin Hatch (R-UT) and Edward Ken-
nedy (D-MA) introduced RLUIPA. 32 President Clinton signed it into
law on September 22, 2000.33 RLUIPA was the latest in a series of bills
28 Id.
29 Heather Wilhelm, Unholy Land Grab, NAT'L RV. ONLINE, Jan. 17, 2006, http://
www.nationalreview.com/comment/wilhelm20060117O926.asp.
30 Blumenthal, supra note 27.
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).
32 146 CONG. REC. 14283, 14283-86 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
33 See Statement on the Signing of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1905, 1906 (Sept. 22, 2000) ("This Act recognizes
the importance the free exercise of religion plays in our democratic society.").
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designed to limit Employment Division v. Smith.3 4 In Smith, the Su-
preme Court rejected the proposition, derived from Sherbert v. Verner
35
and Wisconsin v. Yoder,36 that laws burdening free exercise must pass
strict scrutiny, meaning that they had to serve a compelling govern-
ment interest and follow the least restrictive means of serving that in-
terest.37 Smith drew criticism from many quarters38 and led to the
enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993
(RFRA).3 9 RFRA sought to escape Smith by statutorily restoring
Sherbert.
40
Unimpressed by Congress's attempt to overturn its ruling,41 the
Court struck down RFRA as unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flo-
res.42 The Court held that RFRA unconstitutionally exceeded Con-
gress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
because RFRA failed to demonstrate a "congruence and proportional-
ity" between the constitutional violations Congress sought to prevent
and the means Congress used to prevent them. 43 In short, the Court
thought RFRA was too broad and lacked evidential support.
Congress then considered several bills which sought to legisla-
tively strengthen the Free Exercise Clause and yet comply with
34 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
36 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
37 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 ("We conclude today that the sounder approach, and
the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [com-
pelling interest] test inapplicable to such challenges.").
38 For information on the public outcries over Smith, see Louis FISHER, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN AMERICA 187-88 (2002); PETER K. RoLas, THE RELIGION GUARANTEES
157-59 (2005). Rolf and Fisher also provide a short but thorough history on the
Supreme Court's Free Exercise decisions. For specific criticism of Smith, see generally
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109
(1990).
39 FISHER, supra note 38, at 188-91.
40 ROLFS, supra note 38, at 158.
41 The text of RFRA specifically criticized Smith and stated RFRA's goal of revers-
ing its holding. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Neal Devins, How Not To Challenge the
Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 652-54 (1998).
42 521 U.S. 507. However, Boerne did not invalidate RFRA as applied to the fed-
eral government. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct.
1211, 1225 (2006), the Court relied on RFRA to hold that the government had not
demonstrated a compelling interest in preventing the defendant church's sacramen-
tal use of a hallucinogenic tea.
43 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. Congress had asserted that Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment gave it the authority to pass RFRA. Id. at 516-17.
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Boerne . 4 4 Congress settled on RLUIPA, which relied on Congress's
powers under the Commerce and Spending Clauses rather than on
Section 5,45 and applied only to claims by religious land users and
institutionalized persons.
46
RLUIPA's premise is simple. It states:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in
a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exer-
cise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless
the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden ...
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and, .... is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.
47
This prohibition applies if the substantial burden impacts inter-
state commerce, includes federal funds, or is imposed under a system
of "individualized assessments. ' ' 48 The law is not a blank check ex-
empting religious land users from all land use regulation, 49 but it does
give religious institutions significant legal protection.
50
B. Background to the Supreme Court's Takings Case Law
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
5 1
The Supreme Court's eminent domain jurisprudence revolves around
the definition of "public use": any exercise of eminent domain that
meets the definition is constitutionally permitted if the government
pays 'just compensation." Any use of the power that does not is pro-
hibited no matter how much the government pays.
44 See FISHER, supra note 38, at 200-01.
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2000); FISHER, supra note 38, at 200.
46 FISHER, supra note 38, at 201.
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
48 Id. § 2000cc(a) (2).
49 Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello,Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices,
9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 929, 946 n.109 (2001).
50 Litigants on both sides recognize RLUIPA's power. Compare James L. Dam,
Churches Use New Federal Statute To Win Zoning Cases, LAW. WKLY. USA, Aug. 20, 2001,
available at http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/alert/usa/zoning.htm (last visited
April 18, 2006) ("'We have seen our BB gun replaced by an atomic bomb .... '"
(quoting Brad Daucus, President, Pacific Justice Inst.)), with Stuart Lieberman, Does
RLUIPA Mean That Houses of Worship Get Anything They Want?, REALTry TIMES, Dec. 13,
2003, http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/20031211-rluipa.htm (saying that RLUIPA
makes "planning and zoning boards cringe").
51 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Since the Supreme Court began applying the Fifth Amendment
to the states at the turn of the century, it has interpreted the words
"public use" to mean "public purpose," not "use by the public. ' 52 Pub-
lic purpose, in turn, is a broad concept reflecting "deference to legis-
lative judgments" 53 in determining what kinds of projects benefit the
public. 54 In the fifty years prior to Kelo, the Supreme Court decided
only two eminent domain cases. Those cases are considered to have
encapsulated the modern law of eminent domain.
55
In Berman v. Parker,56 the plaintiffs challenged the condemnation
of their property under the District of Columbia's redevelopment
plan. Congress determined that large sections of the District were
blighted and authorized the District of Columbia Land Agency to as-
semble large tracts of land, by eminent domain if necessary, for urban
redevelopment. 57 The plaintiffs argued that because their depart-
ment store was not blighted, taking their land would not serve the
public purpose of eliminating blight. They also contended that be-
cause a private developer would likely end up with their property, the
taking was for a private use and therefore unconstitutional.
58
The Court rejected their arguments, holding instead that Con-
gress's power under the Public Use Clause was essentially its police
power to serve the public welfare and that the concept of public wel-
fare was "broad and inclusive."59 Justice Douglas wrote that the Court
would not second guess Congress's judgment as to which projects
served the public interest, would not decide how to implement those
projects,60 and would not strike down a project just because land
52 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662-63 (2005).
53 Id. at 2663.
54 This definition of "public use" appeared in the Court's earliest eminent do-
main cases. Id. In early cases, the Court upheld the taking of water rights in order to
construct a dam, Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power
Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916), a mining company's use of an aerial bucket to transport ore
over neighboring property, Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527
(1906), and a statute which allowed one land owner to widen a ditch on a neighbor's
land in order to improve irrigation on his land, Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). In
Strickley, Justice Holmes stressed the inadequacy of the "use by the public" test and
emphatically rejected it. 200 U.S. at 531.
55 John D. Echeverria, Lingle, Etc.: The US. Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy,
[2005] 35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,577, 10,584.
56 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
57 Id. at 28-29.
58 Id. at 31.
59 Id. at 33.
60 Id. at 35-36 ("[T]he amount and character of the land to be taken for the
project and the need for a particular tract ... rests in the discretion of the legislative
branch.").
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might end up in private hands.6' Most importantly, the Court held
that "[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, then the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear."
62
Under this deferential standard, the Court upheld the
condemnation.
63
In Hawaii v. Midkiff6 4 the Court upheld a Hawaii statute which
used the eminent domain power to force lessors to sell their land to
lessees. 65 An oligopoly dominated land ownership in Hawaii, and the
Hawaii legislature sought to break up the land oligarchs' estates. 66 Be-
cause earlier efforts failed, the legislature created a system whereby
residents who met certain qualifications could purchase the land that
they had been leasing.
67
The lessors sued, claiming that because the law essentially trans-
ferred property from one private owner to another, it did not serve a
public purpose. The Court rejected the claim, again equating the em-
inent domain power with the police power and holding that when the
use of eminent domain is "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose," the condemnation is not prohibited by the Public Use
Clause. 68 Just as in Berman, the Court granted the legislature two
levels of deference. By referring to a "conceivable" public purpose, it
granted the legislature deference in deciding why to use eminent do-
main;69 by only requiring that the use of eminent domain be "ration-
ally related" to that public purpose, it granted the legislature
deference in how it used eminent domain.
70
Because of that deferential standard, the Court had "no trouble"
holding that the statute did not violate the Public Use Clause.
71 It
found "regulating oligopoly" to be within the state's police power and
61 Id. at 33-34.
62 Id. at 33.
63 Id. at 36.
64 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
65 Id. at 231-32.
66 Id. at 232-33.
67 Id. If the lessee wanted to buy, he or she asked for an administrative hearing.
If the lessee could show that transferring the lessee's lot would further the statute's
goals, the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) would acquire the resident's lot from the
landlord by negotiation or condemnation and then sell the lot to the former tenant.
Id. at 233-34.
68 Id. at 241.
69 Id.; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("[E]minent domain is
only a means to an end.").
70 Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 ("[T]he amount and
character of the land to be taken... rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.").
71 Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241.
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the Hawaii plan was a rational use of that power.72 As in Berman, the
fact that the land would end up in private hands did not matter.
73
Midkiff reigned as the authoritative statement on eminent do-
main from the Supreme Court for twenty years, and its grant of defer-
ence to legislative determinations allowed governments to wield
immense power through eminent domain.74 All reported federal ap-
pellate decisions between 1954 and 1986 in which the definition of
"public use" was contested upheld the challenged use of eminent do-
main,75 as did thirteen out of the fourteen reported appellate deci-
sions on point between 1986 and 2003.76 Thus, any conflict between
eminent domain and RLUIPA pits one of the government's broadest
powers against one of the most effective statutes for limiting govern-
mental powers.
II. DOES RLUIPA APPLY TO EMINENT DOMAIN ACTIONS?
Before asking whether Kelo permits a government to condemn
religious property for economic development, a threshold question
arises: does RLUIPA apply to eminent domain proceedings? The stat-
ute refers only to zoning and historic preservation laws; it does not
mention eminent domain. If RLUIPA does not apply, then the eco-
nomic development question is moot because RLUIPA cannot protect
churches from any eminent domain proceedings.
A. Eminent Domain Proceedings and RLUIPA Jurisdiction
A church seeking to block a condemnation by using RLUIPA
must first establish RLUIPA jurisdiction. RLUIPA jurisdiction can be
obtained three ways: federal funds, interstate commerce, and a system
of "individual assessments." 77 The church should be able to establish
the latter two in almost all cases.
78
72 Id. at 242.
73 Id. at 243-44.
74 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FrVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSES OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), available at http://www.
castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED-report.pdf (cataloging eminent domain projects
and showing the breadth of the eminent domain power).
75 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 95-96
(1986).
76 Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and
Trends, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 257-60 (2004).
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2000).
78 It is questionable whether the church would want to prove the first element,
because federal funds flowing to the church would likely create an Establishment
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RLUIPA applies if the substantial burden imposed upon the relig-
ious land user, or the removal of that burden, would affect interstate
commerce.7 9 Church condemnation affects interstate commerce be-
cause church construction affects interstate commerce. 80 When a
church's property is condemned, the church will almost certainly have
to build a new building; this construction will affect interstate com-
merce and trigger RLUIPA jurisdiction. Cottonwood used this logic to
apply RLUIPA to eminent domain.8 1 Cottonwoods conclusion appears
sound, especially given the aggregation principle in Wickard v Fil-
burn,8 2 because even if a single church construction does not affect
interstate commerce, church constructions as a whole do.8 3
Jurisdiction also exists through the Commerce Clause even if the
congregation purchases a new church rather than constructing one.
A government will not leave the vacated church intact; it will tear
down the church and construct some other building. That destruc-
tion, construction, and the following increase in commerce will always
create RLUIPA jurisdiction. Economic development is, by definition,
an increase in commerce. A city in this situation faces an ironic di-
lemma: it can accept RLUIPA jurisdiction, or it can make the absurd
and self-defeating argument that its economic development program
will not affect interstate commerce.
Clause problem. Shelly, Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment
Land Uses, 69 Mo. L. REv. 653, 667 (2004).
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2) (B). The Commerce Clause applies to churches,
charities, and nonprofit organizations because even though those organizations do
not engage in traditional commercial activities, they are "major participants in inter-
state markets." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
586 (1997).
80 Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 953.
81 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
82 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
83 Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 953. Recently in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195 (2005), the Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to the Commerce
Clause's aggregation principle expressed in Wickard. Id. at 2206-07. The Court
stated that neither United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), nor United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), blocked Congress's ability to regulate homegrown ma-
rijuana under the Commerce Clause. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210. If homegrown mari-
juana, even if it is never sold, can be regulated under the Commerce Clause, it is
difficult to see how the construction of a church would be outside the Clause. But see
Lara A. Berwanger, Note, White Knight?: Can the Commerce Clause Save the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2355, 2389-401 (2004) (argu-
ing, before Raich, that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it exceeds the Congress's
Commerce Clause power).
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Eminent domain proceedings also fall under RLUIPA jurisdic-
tion because eminent domain involves "formal or informal proce-
dures which permit the government to make individualized
assessments of the proposed uses of the property involved. '84 Emi-
nent domain proceedings, by their nature, are not generally applica-
ble laws because the proceedings single out specific properties for
condemnation.8 5 In Cottonwood, the court found the city's determina-
tion that the church was "blighted," its condemnation decision, and its
determination that Costco was more consistent with its redevelopment
plan all to be individual assessments.8 6 Cottonwoods analysis is sound:
eminent domain proceedings create RLUIPA jurisdiction because
they involve individualized assessments.
B. Eminent Domain Proceedings and RLUIPA's Definition of "Land
Use Regulations"
This jurisdictional analysis does not mean that the church auto-
matically gets RLUIPA's protection; the statute refers to "land use reg-
ulations," so the church must prove that a condemnation qualifies as a
land use regulation. RLUIPA defines "land use regulation" as a "zon-
ing or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant's use or development of land."8 7 The "application
of such a law" phrase is critical, because most condemnations, espe-
cially those done for economic development, are executed pursuant
to a zoning system. 88
Past cases show the link between condemnations and zoning. In
Berman, the plaintiffs' property was condemned under a plan "specify-
ing the boundaries and allocat[ing] the use of the land for various
purposes,"89 or, in other words, a zoning plan. Similarly, the condem-
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(C).
85 See Laycock, supra note 38, at 48-49 (explaining how land use regulations are
not neutral and generally applicable laws); Saxer, supra note 78, at 679. The "individ-
ualized assessments" phrase follows the Smith Court's distinction between laws which
are "neutral and generally applicable" and therefore subject only to rational basis
review, and laws which are not neutral and generally applicable and still subject to
strict scrutiny. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 546 (1993). The "individualized assessments" element was probably written to
create jurisdiction in land use cases. See Saxer, supra note 78, at 667-68.
86 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23. The court analyzed the "individual-
ized assessments" issue under Smith rather than under RLUIPA, but the difference is
immaterial.
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (emphasis added).
88 See Saxer, supra note 78, at 670. Indeed, without the zoning system, it is diffi-
cult to see how the economic development plan could work.
89 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).
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nation in Cottonwood was based on a zoning plan developed by the city
to further economic development. The court found that the condem-
nation was an application of a zoning law and therefore RLUIPA
applied.90
These cases suggest that the church will satisfy the "land use regu-
lation" requirement by showing that the condemnation is done in fur-
therance of a zoning law. Ironically, because Kelo treated the city's use
of a detailed zoning and development plan as a fact favorable to the
city, 91 Kelo may increase the likelihood that future condemnations for
economic development are done under such a plan and thus increase
the likelihood that those condemnations will fall within RLUIPA's
protection. 92 But even where the condemnation is not directly pursu-
ant to a zoning law, two arguments support finding the condemnation
a "land use regulation" for RLUIPA purposes.
Professor Shelly Ross Saxer believes that RLUIPA's legislative his-
tory suggests that its drafters intended the statute to cover eminent
domain.93 Her argument draws support from evidence which suggests
that the same kinds of congressional concerns which prompted the
adoption of RLUIPA apply in the eminent domain context.94 While
valid, Saxer's argument is not conclusive given the limits of legislative
history. A second, stronger argument for finding eminent domain
proceedings to be "land use regulations" comes from the federal
90 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 n.9 ("The Redevelopment Agency's au-
thority to exercise eminent domain .. . is based on a zoning system developed by the
City (the LART Plan). It would unquestionably 'limit [ ] or restrict[ ]' Cottonwood's
,use or development of land.'" (alterations in original)).
91 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005); see also id. at 2670
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
92 Echeverria, supra note 55, at 10,586.
93 Saxer, supra note 78, at 668-69. She points out that when Congress changed
the language of the bill from "a law or decision by the government which limits or
restricts a private person's use or development of land" to the final text, it acted not to
restrict the kind of land use decisions RLUIPA covered but to assuage other civil
rights concerns. Id. The first draft would have covered eminent domain. The
change was made for reasons far removed from eliminating coverage of eminent do-
main. Therefore, she suggests, there is no reason to believe that Congress did not
intend RLUIPA to apply to eminent domain. Id. The final definition of "land use
regulation" under RLUIPA reads, in relevant part, "a zoning or landmarking law, or
the application of such a law that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of
land." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2000).
94 Compare 146 CONG. REc. 16698, 16698 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch
and Sen. Kennedy) (discussing the importance of a ensuring that religious assemblies
have a place of worship in order to preserve the free exercise of religion), with Cotton-
wood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (stating in context of attempted condemnation of
church property that "[i]f Cottonwood could not build a church, it could not exist").
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courts' broad construction of the phrase "land use regulations."
RLUIPA itself mandates that its terms be construed in favor of relig-
ious exercise to the "maximum extent" permitted by the statute and
the Constitution,95 so a court should find a condemnation to be a
land use regulation unless the statute mandates otherwise. Federal
courts have followed this command of broad construction. One case
extended the definition of "land use regulation" to include state, as
well as local regulation. 96 It rejected the state's argument that the
state regulations merely "classified" land while only local authorities
"zoned" land.9 7 In another case, the court found nonaction to consti-
tute an act pursuant to a zoning ordinance.
98
Courts refusing to find a "land use regulation" have not relied on
hair-splitting statutory parsing but have instead rejected only genu-
inely specious claims. 99 The Northern District of Illinois declined to
apply RLUIPA to the condemnation of a church cemetery which
stood in the way of planned expansions to the O'Hare Airport be-
cause it found no connection between zoning and the planned con-
demnation.100 However, even while rejecting the plaintiffs' request to
apply RLUIPA to all condemnations as an attempt to "rewrite"
RLUIPA, the court pointed out that if the city condemned land and
then rezoned the land, RLUIPA would likely come into play.' 0 ' The
decision struck the proper balance. By following the statutory lan-
guage and requiring a connection between condemnation and zon-
ing, the court prevented churches from pushing RLUIPA's
interpretation too far. But it still left churches with substantial protec-
tion because a church is far more likely to face condemnation from a
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). But see Babbit v. Sweet Valley Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 727-28 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
missing broad construction clauses as "empty flourish [es]" that only indicate that
"'this statute means what it means all the way"').
96 Hale 0 Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1070
(D. Haw. 2002).
97 Id.
98 Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 990 (N.D. Il1. 2003).
99 See, e.g., Second Baptist Church of Leechberg v. Gilpin Twp., 118 F. App'x 615,
617 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting claim that mandatory sewer tap-in ordinance was the
application of a zoning law); see also Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th
Cir. 2002) (holding that a city's decision to develop its own land was not the applica-
tion of a zoning or landmarking law but was rather an exercise of its rights as a land-
owner); Saxer, supra note 78, at 669 (observing that courts have interpreted the
definition of land use regulation "broadly").
100 St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 889-900
(N.D. 11. 2005).
101 Id. at 900 n.8.
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zoning-based redevelopment plan than from an airport expansion
plan. 102
However, a New York court recently rejected the reasoning of Cot-
tonwood and St. John's and became the only authority arguing that
RLUIPA does not apply to eminent domain when it permitted the
town to condemn property a church intended for a new building and
turn it into a park.10 3 The court focused on RLUIPA's legislative his-
tory to conclude that Congress did not mean to include eminent do-
main in its definition of "zoning law" 10 4 and further reasoned that,
since eminent domain is a familiar concept, it could "not assume that
Congress simply overlooked it when drafting RLUIPA."'
10 5
To the extent that the legislative history alone does not, and
should not, prove that RLUIPA applied to condemnation, the court
was correct. However, the court failed to apply RLUIPA's provision
that a land use regulation could also be the application of a zoning
law. 10 6 The city marked the church's land for a park as part of the
city's Comprehensive Plan, but the court viewed the connection to
zoning regulations as "too attenuated" to qualify as the application of
a zoning law. 10 7 The court justified its conclusion by "the plain lan-
guage of the statute,"'10 8 but the statute referred to the "application"
of a zoning law.' 0 9 As the Cottonwood court recognized, I I when the
town's decision is based on the town's overall land use plan, a plan
which involves zoning regulations, the town has applied its zoning
laws to condemn the church. This connection is real, not attenuated.
Furthermore, the "plain language" on which the court relied applies
102 Consider the contrasting facts of Cottonwood and St. John's. Moving a cemetery
because it is the only way to expand one of the world's most overcrowded airports is
one thing. But seizing land that had lain vacant for years until the congregation an-
nounced plans to build a church in the name of tax revenues, especially when the cit,
already had a budget surplus and could have put the Costco elsewhere, makes a far
more sympathetic case for the church. It is difficult to believe that the judges in both
cases did not consider the facts as much as the law in deciding whether to apply
RLUIPA.
103 Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y.
2005).
104 Id. at 255-56.
105 Id. at 255. But see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (presenting argu-
ment that RLUIPA's legislative history favors applying RLUIPA to eminent domain).
106 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
107 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
108 Id.
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2000).
110 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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to all applications of zoning laws; it contains no exceptions for appli-
cations which a court considers "too attenuated."
Notwithstanding the New York court's opinion, condemnations
will fall within RLUIPA's definition of a land use regulation because
they will be executed as part of a broader zoning plan. Given Kelo,
this is especially true for condemnations motivated by economic devel-
opment.1 ' No reason exists why eminent domain should be uniquely
excluded from RLUIPA's orbit. Without a reason to exclude eminent
domain from RLUIPA's definition of "land use regulation," the stat-
ute's legislative history, self-contained canon of broad construction,
and federal case law indicate that condemnations of church property
should be governed by RLUIPA.
C. Eminent Domain Proceedings and RLUIPA's Requirement of a
Substantial Burden on the Free Exercise of the Church's
Religious Beliefs
Once a church obtains RLUIPA jurisdiction and proves that emi-
nent domain qualifies as a "land use regulation," the church must still
show that the condemnation substantially burdens its religious exer-
cise before strict scrutiny applies. Common sense suggests that seizing
a congregation's church substantially burdens the free exercise of its
faith. But because common sense and the law, like reason and love,
often keep "very little company together nowadays,"1 12 this Note will
go through a more extended analysis before arriving at the same
conclusion.
1. Can Religious Land Use Qualify as Religious Exercise under
RLUIPA?
Federal courts developed the "substantial burden on religious ex-
ercise" test when performing strict scrutiny review in the decades be-
tween Sherbert1' and Smith.' 14 The Supreme Court's only case
between a religious claimant and the eminent domain power shows
the test's weakness. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 15 the Court permitted the government to build a highway
through sacred Native American land despite claims by Native Ameri-
cans that noise and pollution from the highway would destroy their
111 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
112 WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM act 3, sc. 1.
113 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
114 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990) (discussing develop-
ment of Sherbert test).
115 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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ability to worship on the land.1 16 Rejecting the plaintiffs claims, the
Court held that the First Amendment cannot give the worshipers "a
veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of
religion."' 17 Since the highway did not outlaw the practice of the Na-
tive Americans' faith, the Court found no substantial burden.'
1 8
Taken at face value, Lyng implies that condemnation cannot be a
substantial burden because there is no logical difference between
making land unavailable for worship by building a highway next door
and making land unavailable for worship by giving the land to
Costco.1 9 But Lyng should be understood with three qualifiers. First,
Lyng was decided before RLUIPA was passed, so Lyng cannot end the
analysis. Second, Lyng might not have been about free exercise at all,
but about federal sovereignty. The government owned the land in
question and could do as it chose with its own land. 120 Third, Lyng
stresses that while the Constitution did constrain the federal govern-
ment, the government was free to accommodate the Native Ameri-
can's religious practices and build elsewhere.
121
Lyng may not fully represent the current law, but it offers one
example of how the pre-Smith strict scrutiny test resulted in powerful
rhetoric about the importance of free exercise but few victories for
religious plaintiffs.122 Federal courts never settled on a definition of
116 Id. at 441-42.
117 Id. at 452.
118 Id. at 453 ("[A] law prohibiting [the Native Americans from visiting the sacred
land] would raise a different set of constitutional questions."). The dissent accused
the majority of ignoring reality by failing to distinguish between prohibiting worship
and preventing it. Id. at 458-59, 467 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (calling majority's deci-
sion "astonishing" and refusing to accept its "premise that the form of the govern-
ment's restraint on religious practice, rather than its effect, controls our
constitutional analysis").
119 The condemnation in Lyng exacted an even greater burden. The church
could search for a substitute building; the Native Americans considered the sacred
land irreplaceable.
120 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453 (majority opinion) ("Whatever rights the Indians may
have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its
ight to use what is, after all, its land.").
121 Id. at 454. The reference to accommodation foreshadows RLUIPA. By enact-
ing RLUIPA, Congress has taken the Court at its word and chosen to accommodate
specific religious practices. For a favorable discussion of accommodation, see gener-
ally Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Michael
W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
122 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 38, at 1110; Eugene Volokh, A Common Law
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465, 1495 (1999) (arguing that Sher-
bert was not a regime of strict scrutiny, but one of multiple tests granting different
levels of deference).
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substantial burden, 123 and some courts created an artificially narrow
definition of "religious exercise." 124 Lakewood, Ohio Congregation ofJe-
hovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood 125 represents a typical pre-
Smith case where a court frustrated a religious claim by adopting a
narrow test. Lakewood determined that freedom of worship was
merely "tangentially related" to having a place in which to worship
and that any financial costs to the congregation were only "inciden-
tal." 126 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs, who were accus-
ing the city of exclusionary zoning, could not show either religious
exercise or a substantial burden because the city was not forcing con-
gregation members to change their religious beliefs.
127
Lakewood ignored the well known centrality of a church to a relig-
ious assembly.128 Moreover, the right to assemble "lies at the very core
of religious liberty"; without the right to worship together, many faiths
would not, and could not, exist. 129 By dictating where churches may
exist and what they may look like, land use authorities dictate what
kinds of churches-if any-exist.
130
123 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d
1140, 1151-52 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (collecting cases); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v.
Cypress Redevelopment Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (collect-
ing cases).
124 These courts determined that construction or occupation of a place of worship
was not central or fundamental to the exercise of religion and therefore not pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,
366 F.3d 1214, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). This test immunized land
use authorities from free exercise claims no matter how much of a burden their regu-
lations imposed on congregations and persisted despite Supreme Court precedent
that courts must not inquire into the "centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith." Hernandez v. Comm'r., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
125 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
126 Id. at 307.
127 Id. at 307-08.
128 Often the building itself reflects the assembly's beliefs. First Covenant Church
of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 182 (Wash. 1992) ("The relationship be-
tween theological doctrine and architectural design is well recognized."); see also
Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 941 (observing that increasing diversity of relig-
ious beliefs has led to an increasing variety of church locations and structures).
129 Laycock, supra note 12, at 755-56.
130 Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 941-42. The Lakewood court also over-
looked that it was the Jehovah's Witnesses, the subjects of intense persecution
throughout American history, Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Relig-
ion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 22 (2004), who had been hurt by the land use
regulation rather than some well established and wealthier denomination. See also
146 CONG. REc. 16698, 16698 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Ken-
nedy) (noting that new churches, black churches, and synagogues are most likely to
face discrimination); Laycock, supra note 12, at 770-74 (observing that Jews and
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The Lakewood court's insistence that financial burdens are only
"incidental" was equally naive: it wrongly equated prohibiting religious
worship with preventing it.131 Under the court's logic, the government
could bankrupt a church by imposing a crushing tax on sacramental
elements and yet still claim not to have inhibited the church's right to
free exercise. Governments need to regulate, and regulations impose
costs, but the government should not be permitted to accomplish
through the back door what it cannot accomplish through the front
door. The power to tax is, after all, the power to destroy. 132
While RLUIPA in some ways codified Supreme Court prece-
dent,133 its text also responded to decisions like Lakewood.13 ' It de-
fined religious exercise, for purposes of the statute, as the "use,
building, or conversion of real property" for religious purposes. 135
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside136 discussed the new defini-
tion and determined that the correct question under RLUIPA was
small, less popular denominations are much more likely to face discriminatory land
use regulation). Perhaps the city was motivated by some remaining animus against
the Jehovah's Witnesses and perhaps it was not, but the court should have examined
the issue. This failure to even investigate the possibility of discrimination against a
minority religious group which had frequently been targeted for discrimination ig-
nores the court's purpose of protecting "discrete and insular minorities." Carolene
Prods. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
131 Justice Brennan's dissent in Lyng accused the majority of the same error. See
supra note 118.
132 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819). Given the persuasive power
of money, any government regulation that makes free exercise prohibitively expensive
might persuade someone to modify her religious beliefs-some people would view
significant financial loss as much more coercive than a night in jail. One could an-
swer that such fickle believers do not deserve protection, but the First Amendment
does not protect only the most devoted saints. See also Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n of
New Milford, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189 (D. Conn. 2001) ("Foregoing or modifying the
practice of one's religion because of governmental interference or fear of punish-
ment by the government is precisely the type of 'substantial burden' Congress in-
tended to trigger the RLUIPA's protections; indeed, it is the concern which impelled
the adoption of the First Amendment.").
133 Saxer, supra note 78, at 671 n.135.
134 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir.
2004) (holding that RLUIPA provides a definition of religious exercise and "obviates"
the need for Lakewoods analysis of whether land use constituted religious exercise);
Congregation of Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. Civ.A. 01-1919, 2004 WL 1837037, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004) ("[RLUIPA] undermines the holdings of cases like Lake-
wood."); see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 956 (describing Lakewood as
"astonishing" and "clearly demonstrat[ing] the need for guiding and reinforcing
legislation").
135 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
136 366 F.3d 1214.
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whether the regulation imposed a substantial burden "on the congre-
gations' use of real property for the purpose of religions exercise."
13 7
The definition provided a single, consistent definition of religious ex-
ercise and also foreclosed the Lakewood court's flawed practice of de-
ciding for itself what constitutes religious exercise for a particular
faith and how central that exercise is to that specific faith. Midrash
and the statutory text show that land use regulations can burden relig-
ious exercise in fact and that, despite past court cases, religious land
use qualifies as religious exercise, at least for RLUIPA purposes. 13
2. Can Condemnation Qualify as a Substantial Burden on
Religious Exercise Under RLUIPA?
In applying the substantial burden test in the context of religious
land use, courts have articulated tests which favor finding a substantial
burden in an eminent domain case. 139 While these tests slightly dif-
137 Id. at 1226. The Midrash court saw the new definition as evidence that Con-
gress recognized two facts: the importance of houses of worship to religious congrega-
tions and the burden that land use regulations can impose on religious exercise. Id.
Midrash casts significant doubt on the continuing vitality of Lakewood. See supra note
134.
138 One federal district court agreed that Congress created a new definition of
religious exercise but found the definition an unconstitutional attempt to change the
Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation of "substantial burden." Elsinore
Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1099, 1102 (C.D. Cal.
2003). The court was right to notice the difference but wrong on the constitutional
argument. Defining land use as religious exercise does not change the meaning of
"substantial burden" but rather requires the courts to follow Congress's direction and
"apply the established guideposts of 'substantial burden' analysis in a new context."
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152
(E.D. Cal. 2003); see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 979 (arguing that
RLUIPA does not redefine the substance of constitutional law). The constitutionality
of RLUIPA has been extensively debated elsewhere and will not be discussed further
in this Note.
139 See, e.g., Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 560-70 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that
substantial burden under RLUIPA "pressures the adherent to significantly modify his
religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs," and "a government
action or regulation is significant when it ... influences the adherent to act in a way
that violates his religious beliefs"); Murphy v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that substantial burden under RLUIPA "must 'significantly
inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [per-
son's] individual [religious] beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a [person's] ability to
express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person] reasonable opportuni-
ties to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a [person's] religion"' (alter-
ations in original)); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227 (stating that substantial burden under
RLUIPA is "significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to con-
form his or her behavior accordingly"); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill,
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fer, they all recognize that land use regulation can pressure religious
worshipers to act against their religious conviction to assemble.
140
Under any of these tests, a church's free exercise is substantially bur-
dened when a church's land is condemned.
By seizing the church, the city prevents the congregation from
assembling. The congregation must then attend services elsewhere or
expend substantial time and effort to build a new worship center. If
the members look elsewhere, they may not be able to attend the same
church together or may not find a church which reflects their relig-
ious beliefs. If forced to build, the members will have to put their
worship on hold throughout the process-assuming that they are able
to build at all.141 In either case, the church members will be at least
significantly discouraged, if not completely prevented, from assem-
bling together.
Rev. Roosevelt Gildon's dilemma shows that the closer a church's
ties are to its surrounding community, the greater the burden on its
members if the church's land is taken. Rev. Gildon pastors a small
church in a poor Sand Springs, Oklahoma, area once settled by survi-
vors of the infamous Tulsa Race Riots. 142 The town wants to replace
his church with a Home Depot as part of a lucrative redevelopment
program, but Rev. Gildon replies that his church is not dilapidated
and his congregation's situation makes moving impossible. 143 Rev.
Gildon explains that many members of his congregation walk to
church because they do not own cars144 and that the city's offer of
360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that "substantial burden" for RLUIPA
purposes imposes "a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise").
140 One circuit has adopted a test much less favorable to religious claimants. Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). Over the
vehement dissent of Judge Posner, the court declared that "in the context of
RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exercise, ... a substantial burden on religious
exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility
for rendering religious exercise ... effectively impracticable." Id. at 761. But Posner,
at least, is not inclined to interpret the C.L.U.B. court's "effectively impracticable"
standard too literally. See Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church v.
City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (finding a substan-
tial burden in "delay, uncertainty, and expense"); see also Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227
(rejecting the C.L.UB. decision as rendering part of RLUIPA "meaningless"); Sikh
Soc'y, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1153 (declining to adopt C.L.UB.'s "extremely high" substan-
tial burden threshold).
141 In Cottonwood, the judge suggested that the city would have thwarted any build-
ing program the church undertook. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelop-
ment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1232 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
142 Blumenthal, supra note 27.
143 Wilhelm, supra note 29.
144 Id.
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compensation was not enough for him to obtain a new building.145
Frustrated, Rev. Gildon says that the city does not think his work is as
important as "'raking in money for the politicians to spend,"' but
wonders "'[i]f we leave, who is going to minister to the black commu-
nity in Sand Springs?' '
146
The circuits have slightly different tests for "substantial burden,"
but the variations should not impact the results. For example, one
circuit requires a great "onus" on religious exercise, 147 while another
looks for pressure to significantly modify religious behavior. 148 But a
congregation like Rev. Gildon's can meet either test because the pro-
spective condemnation imposes a great, if not insurmountable, obsta-
cle to religious land use and by doing so significantly pressures the
congregation to stop assembling for worship. Congress intended
RLUIPA to deal with these very situations, where government activity
forces an adherent to abandon the practice of her faith.
149
The Cottonwood court found that the church needed to meet to-
gether in order to effectively practice its faith and that it had spent
five years and millions of dollars obtaining enough land to accommo-
date its congregation.1 50 The city substantially burdened the religious
exercise of the four thousand members when it condemned the prop-
erty. As the court concluded, "Churches are central to the religious
exercise of most religions. If Cottonwood could not build a church, it
could not exist."' 5'
The church could have continued to hold multiple services in a
cramped building and begun its search anew, but this possibility does
not change the substantial burden analysis. The Supreme Court held
in the foundational free exercise case of Sherbert v. VernerI52 that some-
one whose religious convictions against working on the Sabbath
caused her to lose her job could receive unemployment benefits, even
ifa longer search might have turned up a suitable job.153 The search
for new property will almost certainly take longer, impact more peo-
145 Blumenthal, supra note 27.
146 Wilhelm, supra note 29.
147 See case cited supra note 139 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's test).
148 See case cited supra note 139 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's test).
149 Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n of New Milford, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189 (D.
Conn. 2001).
150 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
151 Id. at 1226.
152 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
153 Sherbert wanted ajob that did not require Sabbath work. She had only unsuc-
cessfully applied for three other jobs when she filed for unemployment benefits. Id.
at 402 n.2. Even so, the Court held that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply
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ple, and include more uncertainty than the search for ajob that does
not require Sabbath work.' 5 4 Therefore, if the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits to one person is a substantial burden, destruction of a
church should be a substantial burden on the congregation.
A court confronted in the future with a claim against a city con-
demning a church for economic development should follow Cotton-
wood's lead and apply RLUIPA. Eminent domain proceedings trigger
RLUIPA jurisdiction. Condemnations are "land use regulations" for
RLUIPA purposes. Condemning a church's land imposes a substan-
tial burden on religious land use, which is religious exercise under
RLUIPA.
III. ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST
BEFORE KELO
Even if RLUIPA applies, the land use regulation may stand if it
passes strict scrutiny by serving a compelling state interest and follow-
ing the least restrictive means. To determine whether economic de-
velopment is a compelling state interest, this Note will examine four
sources: the compelling interest test in the broader free exercise con-
text, state supreme court decisions on the conflict between churches
and municipal coffers, RLUIPA's legislative history, and federal dis-
trict courts which have discussed the government's interest in eco-
nomic development.
A. Federal Free Exercise Jurisprudence
While RLUIPA defines religious exercise, RLUIPA does not de-
fine compelling interest but codifies the Supreme Court's definitions
in the Sherbert/Smith/Lukumi line of decisions. 155 In Sherbert, the Court
declared that compelling state interests were only those needed to
prevent "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount [state] inter-
est [s]."' 56 Whenever the test was applied, the government rarely
passed. 157 But because the test was rarely applied in free exercise
the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convic-
tions respecting the day of rest. Id. at 410.
154 See Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. City of New Ber-
lin, 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (comparingjob search in Sherbert to
church's search for suitable land, and finding failure to exhaust all possible avenues
in both cases did not preclude finding substantial burden).
155 Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1091
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
156 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
157 Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1091-93 (citing cases).
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cases, 15 8 strict scrutiny in the free exercise context was dubbed a
"Potemkin doctrine."
1 59
But after the Supreme Court rejected the application of strict
scrutiny to neutral and generally applicable laws in Smith, the test
gained strength. Three years later, the Court held that a law that was
neither neutral nor generally applicable would face strict scrutiny that
is "not 'water[ed] down' but 'really means what it says'"160 and would
be upheld only if it advanced "interests of the highest order" and was
"narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." 16 1 Lukumi's version
of the compelling interest test controls in land use cases because land
use regulations-especially eminent domain proceedings-are not
neutral and generally applicable laws. 162 In the land use context, a
compelling government interest is one that is needed to prevent a
"clear and present, grave and immediate" danger to public health,
peace, and welfare. 163 Two cases applying Lukumi in the land use con-
text illustrate this principle.
In Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland,164 the court found that a historic
preservation ordinance was not generally applicable because it only
impacted some properties and because even impacted property own-
ers could apply for and receive individual exemptions. 16 5 The cityjus-
tified its ordinance by its interests in property values, aesthetic values,
and preserving the city's heritage; the court rejected all these interests
158 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) ("We have never invali-
dated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of
unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the
Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied ...
159 McConnell, supra note 38, at 1110.
160 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888).
161 Id. The Court does not say why it was strengthening the test when dealing with
nonneutral and nongenerally applicable laws. Two possible explanations are that the
greater possibility of a nonneutral law being enacted for a discriminatory purpose
warrants increased scrutiny and that, since the Court would not have to apply the test
to so many laws, it could afford to strengthen the test without significantly interfering
with the other branches of government.
162 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text; see also Storzer & Picarello, supra
note 49, at 949-52 (arguing that land use regulations are not neutral and generally
applicable laws).
163 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash.
1993); see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 963 (citing First Covenant Church
for compelling interest standard in land use context, and offering fire safety and oc-
cupancy requirements as "obvious examples of compelling interests").
164 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
165 Id. at 886.
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as not compelling. 66 In Alpine Christian Fellowship v. City Commissioners
of Pitkin County, 16 7 the City Commissioners refused to grant a Christian
school an operating permit. Finding that the permit denial was an
"individualized question," the court held that Lukumi, rather than
Smith, applied, and therefore state interests which would 'justify zon-
ing codes in general [were] not applicable."' 68 The court rejected the
city's interest in limiting noise and traffic as not compelling.
69
An underdeveloped economy may pose problems, but it is not a
"clear and present, grave and immediate" danger to public health,
peace, and welfare. 1 70 If public health is not compelling, and it was
not in Lukumi, economic development should not be compelling be-
cause that would place a higher value on citizens' economic welfare
than on their physical welfare. Keeler specifically found that property
values, which are part of overall economic development, did not rise
to the level of a compelling interest. 17' Thus, federal free exercise
cases suggest that economic development in general and tax revenue
in particular are not compelling interests.
B. State Supreme Courts
In 1953 the Diocese of Rochester determined that its aging facil-
ity inadequately served its growing congregation and began the search
for new property.' 7 2 After acquiring the only suitable property in the
area for a new parish, it applied for the needed special use permit.
The town board denied the permit and claimed that several "compel-
ling" interests justified the denial.1 73 The New York Court of Appeals
rejected the town's interests in keeping churches out of built-up areas,
traffic hazards, and maintaining property values as not compelling. 174
The town also claimed a compelling interest in tax revenue and
complained that, because the church would be exempt from property
166 Id.; see also Powers, supra note 20, 179-80 (listing traffic, aesthetics, and prop-
erty values as legitimate but not compelling interests).
167 870 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. 1994).
168 Id. at 994.
169 Id. at 994-95
170 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash.
1993).
171 940 F. Supp. at 886.
172 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827, 829 (N.Y.
1956).
173 Id. at 830-31.
174 Id. at 835-36. The court's rejection of the interest in property values echoes
the Keeler court's rejection of the same interest. See supra notes 164-66 and accompa-
nying text.
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taxes, granting the church an exemption would cost the town reve-
nue. 175 The court rejected the argument and refused to allow the
town to deny the permit merely because the town would make more
money without the church. Diocese of Rochester held that since a higher
authority, the State of New York, had already declared that churches
were tax-exempt because they benefited the public welfare, the town
could not claim that excluding the church would serve the public wel-
fare by increasing revenue. 176 The court then repeated its holding for
emphasis: "No municipality can justly refuse a permit to build a
church only because the property will no longer be subject to taxa-
tion."'177 If a municipality cannot deny a congregation the right to
build a church because of a potential loss of tax revenue from the
property, it follows that a municipality cannot condemn church prop-
erty in order to obtain economic benefits from the property which it
had never before received.
When denying a special use permit to a congregation of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, the City of Chicago framed its interest as "the detri-
mental effect of a church in a solid business block" rather than as a
naked interest in tax receipts. 17 This recasting failed: the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that even if the church diminished the value of the
adjacent stores (and thus the amount of tax revenue the stores would
generate), the permit denial was still arbitrary, capricious, unrelated
to the public welfare, and therefore invalid.1 79 Because the city's rea-
soning could have supported denying permits to all churches, the
175 Diocese of Rochester, 136 N.E.2d at 830-31. The clash was similar to Cottonwood,
as it pitted a growing church seeking a new facility against municipal authorities seek-
ing tax revenue. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
176 Diocese of Rochester, 136 N.E.2d at 836.
177 Id. Twenty years later, in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of North Shore, Inc. v.
Village of Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1975) (plurality opinion), the New York
Court of Appeals was asked to reconsider Diocese of Rochester in light of an allegedly
more modem view that churches should be subjected to the same zoning restrictions
as other entities, id. at 538. Writing for the plurality, Judge Fuchsberg's opinion reaf-
firmed Diocese of Rochester and, although the facts dealt with a fencing ordinance, spe-
cifically said that tax revenue was not a compelling interest. Id. He also held that,
while the Town's interests in public welfare were valid, they were outweighed by the
interests of free exercise and the "public benefit and welfare which is itself an attri-
bute of religious worship in a community." Id.; see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note
49, at 935 n.36 (collecting more recent sources on value of churches to a
community).
178 Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witness, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals of
Chi., 182 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ill. 1962). One wonders if the city framed its interest in
this manner because its lawyers had read Diocese of Rochester.
179 Id. The rejection of "diminution in value" interest demonstrates that a govern-
ment will not be able to recast its motivation for condemning religious property from
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city's reasoning was inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of
free exercise and therefore unacceptable. 180
In Jacobi v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Lower Moreland Town-
ship,18' the Board granted the Archdiocese of Philadelphia a special
exception in order to operate a church, convent, and parochial
school. When local property owners sued, arguing that the exception
was contrary to the "health, safety and general welfare of the inhabi-
tants of the Township," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court admitted
that the religious complex might increase the need for township ser-
vices without increasing the township's coffers. 18 2 But the court
found any loss harmless to the general welfare because the legislature
had already determined that religious institutions promoted the gen-
eral welfare when it granted them tax-exempt status.
a8 3
Because these cases have not been limited, overruled, or even
substantially criticized in later judicial opinions, 8 4 the best way to at-
tack their holdings is to dismiss them as outdated. However, the at-
tack fails because the courts' reasoning rests on a timeless legal
principle: the allocation of power between superior and inferior levels
of government. The cases argue that, when a state determines that
exempting religious entities from property taxes is in the public's best
interest, the city, as a creature of the state, has no right to usurp the
state's authority and declare that the public's interest would be better
served if the land generated property taxes. Every state exempts
tax revenue to some broader economic interest and thereby defeat the compelling
interest test.
180 Id.
181 196 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1964).
182 Id. at 744.
183 Id. at 745.
184 On April 19, 2006, I ran these three cases-Jacobi, Diocese of Rochester, and Co-
lumbus Park through KeyCite on Westlaw's online database. When I checked Jacobi, I
found 45 positive citing references in other cases and no negative references. When I
checked Diocese of Rochester, I found 88 positive citing references and only two negative
references, one which distinguished the case and one which said that while it was
accepted in many jurisdictions, it was not the law of Pennsylvania. When I checked
Columbus Park, I found 28 positive references and four negative references. One nega-
tive reference was listed as calling Columbus Park into doubt and thus represented the
most serious criticism of any of these three cases. However, the critical case was City of
Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc., 749
N.E.2d 916 (I1. 2001). For a discussion of why Living Word, rather than Columbus
Park, should be considered wrongly decided, see infra notes 219-27. While this short
search is far from definitive because it does not examine academic literature for possi-
ble criticism, the search at least suggests that these three older state cases are still
good law.
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churches from property tax and has done so for centuries. 185 This
exemption reflects a policy judgment that churches benefit a commu-
nity in tangible and intangible ways and therefore belong in communi-
ties.186 Attempts to exclude them are short-sighted. Even Justice
Brennan, generally considered a supporter of a strong Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, has recognized, and approved, this policy judg-
ment. 87 Perhaps the municipality does not like the state legislature's
policy and wants to set aside a three-hundred-year-old and universally
approved practice for its own short-term financial enrichment. If so,
the municipality should have the courage and integrity to make the
challenge openly, in the legislature, and not clandestinely, through
land use regulations.
188
C. The Legislative History Surrounding RLUIPA
Before passing RLUIPA, Congress held extensive hearings that
catalogued the practices of land use authorities toward churches 189
and used evidence from these hearings as justification for passing
RLUIPA. 190 The House report on RLUIPA presented evidence of
land use authorities acting for many reasons Congress considered ille-
gitimate and included evidence of municipalities wielding zoning law
against churches for the sole purpose of keeping as much land as pos-
sible on the tax rolls. 91 If municipal decisions against churches based
on tax and economic interests partially motivated Congress to pass
RLUIPA, those interests should not be sufficient to overcome
RLUIPA's protection. Courts have cited this record as evidence that
185 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970); id. at 681 (Brennan,J.,
concurring).
186 Storzer & Picarello, supra note 49, at 934-36.
187 Walz, 397 U.S. at 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
188 See supra notes 175-77, 183 and accompanying text (discussing why the legisla-
ture's policy judgment should trump a city's claim); see also Laycock, supra note 12, at
762. Laycock argues that the primary reason land use authorities thwart religious
land use is because "they do not want property taken off the tax rolls" and accuses
them of wrongfully "using land concerns as a subterfuge to fight the state legislature's
policy of tax exemption." Id. Another professor agrees that in making land use deci-
sion, "cities are in a mad race for revenues." Weinberg, supra note 8, at 3.
189 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 5-12, 18-24 (1999) (compiling testimony); Storzer &
Picarello, supra note 49, at 984 (stating that Congress held nine hearings over three
years on the subject).
190 146 CONG. Rxc. 16698, 16698-99 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy).
191 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 19.
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Congress did not intend economic development to be a compelling
interest. 1
92
A contrary conclusion assumes that Congress passed a self-defeat-
ing statute where the exception swallows the rule. A hypothetical en-
vironmental statute illustrates this point as well. Suppose Congress,
concerned that mining companies were putting profits before envi-
ronmental responsibility in refusing to fill open pit mines, passed a
law requiring mining companies to fill in exhausted mines unless the
company obtained a special permit not to fill in the mine. Congress
instructs the EPA to grant permits only in "extraordinary circum-
stances." From this record, one would not expect a mining company
to receive a permit if its only argument to the EPA was "filling in the
mine will cut our profits." Likewise, given RLUIPA's record, a govern-
ment should not be allowed to condemn religious land if its only argu-
ment is "this condemnation will lead to increased tax revenue." In
both RLUIPA and the hypothetical environmental statute, Congress
has openly disapproved of an entity putting too much weight on mon-
etary concerns when making a decision. In both cases, Congress has
responded with a law raising the bar the entity must clear before it can
to do what it wanted, whether that was condemning church property
or leaving an open pit mine open. In neither case should the entity
be able to clear that bar by relying on the very motivation Congress
wanted to eliminate-financial gain.
D. Federal District Courts
1. Two District Courts Have Found That Economic Development
Is Not a Compelling Interest
The Cottonwood courtjustified its conclusion that revenue was not
a compelling interest on two grounds. First, following the reasoning
of the previously discussed state courts, it determined that revenue
could not be compelling because if it were, then the city could ex-
clude all religious entities from its borders. 193 Second, the court de-
termined that in the land use context, a compelling interest is one
where government activity is needed "to 'protect public health or
safety."' 19 4 Because an increase in tax revenue alone did not improve
192 Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
193 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also supra notes 175-77, 183 and accompanying text.
194 Id. (quoting First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174,
185 (Wash. 1993)).
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the public health and safety, the court found the interest in revenue
not compelling.
Revenue generation does not protect public health and safety in
the same way the town's fire code or the zoning of chemical plants
might. Even if revenue from the church's property were needed to
protect public health and safety under some extreme circum-
stances, 195 the Cottonwood court determined that the city did not need
revenue from the Cottonwood property in order to protect public
health and safety. The city had not received revenue from the prop-
erty as it had lain vacant for the previous twelve years, but public
health and safety had not been compromised. More importantly, at
the same time the city was explaining the importance of its interest in
possible revenue from Cottonwood's property, the city's mayor was
running for reelection boasting that the city enjoyed a twenty-five per-
cent budget surplus.196
This discrepancy between the city's assertions inside the court-
room and its actions outside the courtroom drove the court's skepti-
cism about the city's asserted interest in revenue. 197 The court also
concluded that, even if revenue was a compelling interest, the city was
"using a sledgehammer to kill an ant."198 RLUIPA's strict scrutiny also
requires that the government use the least restrictive means when
pursing its compelling interest. Under the least restrictive means re-
quirement, the city had to justify why it condemned the particular prop-
erty that Cottonwood owned in order to further this interest. 199 The city
195 A city with no money could not enforce its fire code, pay its police, or pay its
zoning commissioner to keep chemical plants out of certain parts of the city. Since
the compelling interest test is "a standard that responds to facts and context," Elsinore,
291 F. Supp. 2d at 1092, one could conceive of a situation where revenue might be a
compelling interest. A city such as New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina might
have an argument that revenue from the church's land is needed immediately to
protect public health and safety. However, if the city were receiving substantial
outside assistance, either in manpower or finances, the need would no longer be im-
mediate, and the interest no longer compelling.
196 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. The Mayor also bragged that she had not
even passed a utility tax to achieve this surplus, id., a fact that might have helped her
campaign but did not help the city's case.
197 Perhaps the city was indeed motivated by revenue; if so, it lost for the right
reason. But some of the surrounding evidence and the tone of the court's opinion
suggest that the judge suspected a deeper motivation. See id. at 1228, 1232 n.17 (call-
ing the interest in revenue "suspect," and suggesting that the "reluctant" city might
oppose any attempt by the church to assemble property); see also Gallagher, supra
note 22 (calling the judge's opinion in the case "unprecedented" and "a stinging
rebuke" to the city).
198 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
199 Id.
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failed this prong of the test because it made no showing that it could
not have increased revenue other ways, such as by developing around
the church or by condemning other property. 2°10 In future cases, a
church should not focus its argument so much on whether economic
development is a compelling interest that the church overlooks
RLUIPA's important least restrictive means requirement; but, a fur-
ther discussion of that second prong is outside the scope of this
Note.
2 0 1
Elsinore Christian Center, although decided in the zoning context,
reaches the same conclusion as Cottonwood. Like Cottonwood, Elsinore
found that if tax revenue constituted a compelling interest, cities
could always exclude churches and RLUIPA would be meaningless.
20 2
Elsinore also looked to RLUIPA's legislative history and concluded that
"property tax revenue is a potentially pretextual basis for decision-
making that appears to have been a specific target of RLUIPA." 20 3 On
these grounds, the court refused to find that revenue was a compel-
ling interest.
20 4
2. Two Cases Could Be Taken To Support Finding Economic
Development To Be a Compelling Interest
Any city looking to defend its condemnation of religious land will
likely turn to International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of Chi-
cago Heights20 5 and City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full
200 Id.
201 In short, if the government could promote economic development without
condemning the religious property, but condemns the property anyway, the govern-
ment will fail strict scrutiny. In Cottonwood, the city could have developed different
property. In larger development cases such as Kelo, the city could make the develop-
ment smaller or build the development around the existing church.
The prospective condemnation of Rev. Gildon's Centennial Baptist Church, see
supra text accompanying notes 142-49, presents a good example because, even
though "the church could easily live side-by-side with new stores, houses, or busi-
nesses," the city remains intent on condemning the church. Wilhelm, supra note 29.
A city's insistence on condemning a church where there appears to be enough room
for development without taking the church may rile religious liberty advocates. See id.
But church advocates might end up thanking the city for its apparent stubbornness,
because the city's refusal to consider developing around the church might translate
into a failure to use the least restrictive means and thus into a powerful legal argu-
ment for the church.




205 955 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. I1. 1996).
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Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc. 206 Both cases were decided before
RLUIPA, and Congress criticized Living Word when it drafted
RLUIPA.20 7 These events alone would cast doubt on the cases' rele-
vance, even if they had been well reasoned. They were not. Neverthe-
less, they must be examined because they represent the strongest legal
support for finding economic development a compelling government
interest.
208
The cases arose from the same facts.20 9 Chicago Heights adopted
a zoning plan to promote commercial development. 2 10 The church,
having been burned out of its location in 1993, found a piece of prop-
erty available for a good price.211 When the church applied for the
needed permit, the city denied the permit as inconsistent with its zon-
ing and commercial redevelopment plan.2 1 2 The church sued, first in
federal court under RFRA and later in state court. The cases will be
addressed in that order.
The federal court first said that denying the permit did not sub-
stantially burden the church's free exercise213-a dubious conclusion
in light of RLUIPA.2 1 4 Perhaps because it found no substantial bur-
den, the court devoted only two paragraphs to the compelling interest
206 707 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 749 N.E.2d 916 (Ill.
2001).
207 H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 19-22 & nn.72 & 98 (1999); see also Congregation of
Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. Civ.A. 01-1919, 2004 WL 1837037, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
17, 2004) (stating that RLUIPA "undermines" cases like International Church).
208 An unreported federal appellate case held that promoting commercial devel-
opment was an interest sufficient to pass a rational basis standard for free exercise
burdens under Smith. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch,
100 F. App'x 70, 75 (3d Cir. 2004). This holding is unremarkable because a signifi-
cant difference exists between an interest which will satisfy Smith's rational basis re-
view and a compelling interest which will satisfy RLUIPA. The court gave no
indication that it sought to bridge that gap. Similarly, an Illinois court permitted the
condemnation of a mosque's property as part of a redevelopment plan. Sw. Ill. Dev.
Auth. v. A1-Muhajirum, 744 N.E.2d 308 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). However, the mosque's
properties were undisputedly blighted and were condemned for that reason (the
court even mentioned that it saw pictures of the property). Id. at 311. The court did
not hold that economic development justified condemning religious property; it only
rejected the mosque's novel argument that since the properties were religious, they
could not be have been blighted. Id.
209 Int'l Church, 955 F. Supp. at 879 (contested property located on Lincoln High-
way); Living Word, 707 N.E.2d at 55 (same).
210 Int'l Church, 955 F. Supp. at 879.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 880.
214 See supra Part II.C.
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analysis. 215 The court then said that the city's actions satisfied strict
scrutiny, but it neither specifically identified the compelling interest
nor explained why the city's denial of the permit was the least restric-
tive means of accomplishing that interest.216 The court did say that
the city "must create an economic underpinning," so one can assume
that phrase was the court's formulation of the compelling interest, but
the court cited no authority that "creating an economic underpin-
ning" is a compelling interest-or even a substantial interest.217 The
opinion also failed to discuss any past cases which found a compelling
governmental interest or explain why "creating an economic under-
pinning" was similar to any previously accepted compelling inter-
ests. 21 8  International Church asserted an ambiguous compelling
interest without analysis or authority. This omission undermines the
case's persuasive value.
The church then turned to the state courts. The Illinois Court of
Appeals held that the zoning restrictions furthered two compelling
interests: creation of a stronger tax base and enforcement of zoning
laws. 219 The latter interest demonstrates bootstrapping at its worst: if
the government has a compelling interest in enforcing its zoning laws,
whatever laws it enacts will automatically pass strict scrutiny simply be-
cause the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the law.
This logic eviscerates the compelling interest test and cannot be
accepted.
For its more sophisticated, but still erroneous, conclusion that
"maintaining a sound tax system" is a compelling interest, Living Word
cited Hernandez v. Commissioner.220  In Hernandez, Scientologists
claimed that by refusing to consider payments for doctrinal training
courses tax-deducible, the IRS violated the Scientologists' free exer-
215 Int'l Church, 955 F. Supp. at 881.
216 Id. Indeed, the court never examines any possible alternative ways for the city
to accomplish its (vague) goal.
217 Id.
218 In a further demonstration of dubious reasoning, the court responded to the
church's claim that it was being excluded because it is exempt from property taxes by
saying that the church is not being excluded for that reason but because the church is
noncommercial. Id. This conclusion partially missed the point: the reason the
church is exempt from property taxes is because the property is being used for relig-
ious and noncommercial purposes. See 35 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 200/15-40 (West
1996) (amended 2001) (requiring exclusive use for religious purposes and absence of
profit motive for property tax exemption).
219 City of Chi. Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries,
Inc. 707 N.E.2d 53, 59 (11. App. Ct. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 749 N.E.2d 916 (Ill.
2001).
220 Id. (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989)).
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cise rights. The Supreme Court responded that, even if the denial
constituted a substantial burden, it was justified by the government's
compelling interest in a "sound tax system."221 The Living Word court
took Hernandez to mean that the government has a compelling inter-
est in increasing the amount of revenue as a whole.
222
But this conclusion overlooks the context of the Supreme Court's
statement: the entire phrase defines the interest as "'maintaining a
sound tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions flowing from a wide vari-
ety of religious beliefs.'"223 The Supreme Court was concerned not
with lost government revenue but with the specter of an income tax
system full of confusing exceptions where one's ability to claim the
exception depended on one's religious beliefs. In the same para-
graph, the Supreme Court stressed that a tax "must be uniformly ap-
plicable to all, except as Congress specifically provides explicitly
otherwise."2 24 The Supreme Court focused on uniformity, order, and
congressional authority; it did not worry about the size of the federal
treasury. Hernandez did not hold that governments have a compelling
interest in getting more money, so the Living Word court was unjusti-
fied in reading Hernandez as saying it did.
If Hernandez is relevant, it favors a church fighting an economi-
cally motivated condemnation because it stresses Congress's role in
providing tax exemptions.2 2 5 Congress provided an exemption when
it passed RLUIPA with legislative history suggesting that economic
concerns did not justify hindering religious land use.226 More impor-
tantly, each of the fifty states provided exemptions when they declared
religious land users free from property taxes. The city has no right to
use land regulation as a pretext to thwart the property tax
exemption.
227
Before Kelo, the Supreme Court had never addressed whether ec-
onomic development was a compelling interest, but the tone of free
exercise case law suggests that it has never been considered a compel-
ling interest. Three state supreme courts reached the same conclu-
sion. RLUIPA's legislative history indicates that its drafters would
have agreed. Two district courts ruled that economic development
221 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699.
222 Living Word, 707 N.E.2d at 59.
223 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
260 (1982)).
224 Id. at 700.
225 Id. Congress's ability to provide that exemption again raises the issue of ac-
commodation, which is mentioned supra note 121.
226 See supra Part III.C.
227 See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
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was not compelling. The only cases reaching the opposite conclusion
either ignored or misunderstood precedent. Therefore, the best un-
derstanding is that before Kelo, economic development was not a com-
pelling interest.
IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST
AFTER KELO
We have seen that RLUIPA applies to condemnation proceedings
and that economic development was not a compelling interest before
Kelo. The only remaining question is whether the sound and fury sur-
rounding Kelo signifies any legal change. The various opinions in the
case and the surrounding academic commentary show that it does
not.
As even a casual reader of the headlines now knows, the City of
New London attempted to reverse its economic decline by planning a
massive waterfront redevelopment project.228 The city convinced Pfi-
zer to build a $300 million research facility to anchor the project.2
29
But since the city planned the project on land it did not own, the city
had to obtain the land to complete the project. Most area property
owners willingly sold, but a few turned down the city's offer. Susette
Kelo, who did not want to leave her waterfront view, and Wilhelmina
Dery, an eighty-seven-year-old woman who still lived in the same house
in which she was born, refused to leave. 230
When persuasion failed, the city turned to force; the day before
Thanksgiving in 2000, it nailed a condemnation notice to Kelo's
door.23' Kelo and her neighbors then sued to stop the condemna-
tion, arguing that it was outside the Fifth Amendment's Public Use
Clause because unblighted property was being taken solely for eco-
nomic development and being given to another private party. A bit-
terly divided Connecticut Supreme Court ruled 4-3 for the city.
2 32
The court relied on state and federal precedent for its conclusion that
"public use" meant "public purpose" and that a public purpose was a
broad term which included economic development.233
228 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
229 Id. at 2659.
230 Id. at 2660. For a detailed analysis of the facts of Kelo, see Elizabeth F. Gal-
lagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 1837 (2005).
231 Steven E. Buckingham, Comment, The Kelo Threshold: Private Property and Pub-
lic Use Reconsidered, 39 U. RiCH. L. REV. 1279, 1289 (2005).
232 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
233 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660 (saying that the Connecticut Supreme Court relied on
Berman and Midkiff in reaching its decision).
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Had the case been decided a decade ago, it may not have made
the news; it simply applied Berman and Midkiff in an unremarkable
way.
2 3 4 But Kelo was decided amidst a revived public debate over emi-
nent domain and a shifting judicial landscape. From the Berman deci-
sion in 1954 to 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency
2 35
in 2002, not a single federal case rejected an eminent domain pro-
ceeding as not being for a public use.236 Then within two years, three
federal courts blocked a condemnation as outside the Public Use
Clause, which was an "amazing" judicial development "considering
the preceding droughi."237 Several state courts departed from the
deferential federal standard and limited eminent domain powers
under their state constitutions.238 Most notably, the Michigan Su-
preme Court reversed its notorious Poletown decision.2 39
The court of public opinion also shifted against the broader defi-
nition of public use. Abuses of eminent domain which enriched pri-
vate parties were broadly publicized and created a public backlash. 240
234 See id.; Echeverria, supra note 55, at 10,584 ("Given the lack of any genuine
issue about the appropriate legal standard.. . persuading the Court to grant certio-
rari in Kelo was quite an accomplishment.").
235 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
236 Wilk, supra note 76, at 270.
237 Id. at 271. Besides 99 Cents Only Stores, the other two federal cases were Cotton-
wood, which has been discussed throughout this Note, and Daniels v. Area Plan Commis-
sion of Alan County, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002). Wilk, supra note 76, at 271.
238 Wilk, supra note 76, at 267-70 (mentioning the courts in New Jersey, Massa-
chusetts, Illinois, and Michigan).
239 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). In
Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court approved a plan condemning a large tract of
land and transferring it to General Motors for a new assembly plant. Poletown, 304
N.W.2d at 457. The case led to an expansion of eminent domain at a state level and
came to symbolize expansive eminent domain powers. Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful
Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
651, 651, 655 (2005).
240 See, e.g., BERLINER, supra note 74 (cataloging eminent domain abuses); GREEN-
HUT, supra note 20 (devoting entire book to exposing eminent domain abuses); Patri-
cia E. Salkin & Lora A. Lucero, Community Redevelopment, Public Use, and Eminent
Domain, 37 URB. LAW. 201, 218-223 (2005) (discussing the public outcry over a rede-
velopment plan in Lakewood, Ohio, which resulted in the plan being defeated and its
authors voted out of office); 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain Being Abused, CBS NEWS, July
4, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.
shtml (warning audience about eminent domain abuses). Most of the outrage arises
from the belief that the Public Use Clause is being used to benefit private corpora-
tions. SeeJudy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
2005, at B2 (reporting that, before and after Kelo, the public sees eminent domain as
a way the rich get richer at the expense of everyone else).
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When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kelo, some commenta-
tors noticed a parallel between the recently overruled Poletown taking,
which benefited GM, and the Kelo taking, which benefited Pfizer and
hoped that Kelo, like Poletown, would be overruled. 241
On June 23, 2005, the Court handed down a 5-4 decision in favor
of the city. Justice Stevens affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court's
conclusion that economic development was a valid public purpose
consistent with the Public Use Clause. 242 So long as the condemna-
tion served a rational public purpose, the fact that another private
party ended up owning the land was not relevant. The case immedi-
ately made the headlines and earned withering editorial scorn.
243
One paper called the decision "not only one of the most unpopular
decisions in recent memory, but one of the worst as well." 244 The
commentators typically framed the case as an expansion of eminent
domain power. They described private property protection as "im-
mensely diminished" 24 5 or "crippled '246 by a decision which was more
suited to a communist government 247 and would lead to "dark
days" 2 4 8 in the future for homeowners. These attacks reveal a view
that Kelo made new law. A prediction of "dark days ahead" presup-
poses that sunnier days existed before. The perception that the Court
had somehow gone too far drove cries for legislative remedies.
249
241 See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use, " and New Directions in
Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 845, 854 (stating that Hathcock may be a
turning point in eminent domain law); Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Lu Harden, Government
Theft: The Taking of Private Property To Benefit the Favored Few, 15 GEO. MASON U. CRI.
RTS. L.J. 81 (2004) (discussing Kelo, Poletown, Hathcock, and other eminent domain
cases, and expressing hope that the Supreme Court would use Kelo to contain emi-
nent domain).
242 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
243 See Michael M. Berger, What Has the Supreme Court Done to-or for-Land Use?,
in LAND USE INSTITUTE PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND
COMPENSATION 64, 73 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Aug. 25-27, 2005), available at WL
SL005 ALI-ABA 63. The article cites nine editorials from papers nationwide, includ-
ing the Boston Globe, Cincinnati Inquirer, Houston Chronicle, and Chicago Tribune, pub-
lished the week of the decision, and adds that "the outpouring of invective has
continued unabated ever since." Id. The article points out that the usually liberal
papers attacked the decision. Id.
244 John Ehinger, The Court Errs Badly, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, June 25, 2005, at B4.
245 Editorial, Kennedy's Vast Domain, WALL. ST. J., June 24, 2005, at A12.
246 Editorial, Court Cripples Property Rights, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 24, 2005, at
8B.
247 Editorial, Stealing Home, HOUSTON CHRON., June 25, 2005, at B8.
248 Editorial, Dark Days Ahead for Property Owners, RocKv MTN. NEWS (Denver,
Colo.), June 24, 2004, at 48A.
249 See Preciphs, supra note 6, for the congressional response. At the state level,
bills or constitutional amendments proposing limits on the power of eminent domain
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Even if the commentators are right that Kelo was an unwise and
unpopular decision, they are mistaken in viewing it as a new and radi-
cal decision. A careful look at the majority opinion reveals that the
idea that Kelo granted the government some new power is a product
of rhetoric, not of reality. Throughout the opinion, Justice Stevens
relies heavily on precedent. He never invokes the policy arguments or
flexible interpretative techniques that normally characterize the
Court's more groundbreaking opinions.
2 50
Justice Stevens cites Berman and Midkiff twenty-three times
throughout his opinion.2 51 Such reliance on prior cases in the same
field is not the mark of a watershed case. He emphasized that
"[w] ithout exception," past cases had construed the Public Use Clause
broadly.252 When asking whether economic development is a public
use, he does not discuss policy or argue that cities needed broad emi-
nent domain powers to implement creative strategies for combating
societal challenges. 253  Rather, Stevens simply determines that
"[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long ac-
cepted function of government" and supports his statement with cita-
tions to Berman, Midkiff and earlier eminent domain cases. 254 Stevens
characterizes Kelo as indistinguishable from past cases and accuses the
plaintiffs of trying to avoid the weight of precedent. 25 5 The majority's
claim of following precedent is not conclusive, as past decisions have
have been introduced in thirty state legislatures, and in three states governors have
temporarily halted condemnations. Coleman, supra note 240. However, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the difference between a bill being introduced and such a
bill actually becoming law. It is too early to determine what the permanent impact of
Kelo on state eminent domain law will be, although even before Kelo some states were
limiting the power. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (relying on "evolving
standards of decency" to find juvenile death penalty unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality
opinion)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2002) (citing international sources,
and arguing that "later generations" may be able to recognize the oppressive nature
of certain longstanding laws).
251 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658-69 (2005).
252 Id. at 2663.
253 For a commentator who made this argument, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Goods, the Bads, and the Ugly, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb., 2005, at 18.
254 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665 (stating there was "no principled way of distinguishing"
between Kelo and past cases).
255 Id. at 2666 ("Again, our cases foreclose this objection."); id. at 2667 (sug-
gesting that petitioners' alternative rule was "an even greater departure from . . .
precedent").
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purported to be following precedent when they were ignoring it,2 5 6
but Kelo's use of precedent at least suggests that it is not the watershed
case its populist critics allege.
The professional commentary supports the same conclusion.
Before the case was handed down, commentators disagreed over who
should win but agreed that a win for Kelo would shift the law. For
property-rights supporters, Kelo offered a chance for the Court to re-
consider its prior holdings in Berman and Midkiff2 5 7 The key word is
reconsider the property rights supporters wanted the court to change
the law.
Supporters of New London also framed their argument in terms
of maintaining the status quo. Professor Thomas Merrill pointed to
Hathcock's reasoning as a way the Supreme Court could narrow emi-
nent domain power but stated that such reasoning would only be em-
ployed if the Court wanted to "avoid the conclusion" toward which its
prior cases pointed. 258 Another commentator was concerned that the
Court would "overreact" to well known stories of eminent domain
abuse and limit the needed powers which government currently en-
256 Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
may be the most infamous example. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 38, at 1120, 1125
(arguing that Smith's use of precedent borders on "shocking" and consists of "over-
ruled and minority positions").
257 See Alan T. Ackerman, The Changing Landscape and Recognition of the Public Use
Limitation: Is Hathcock a Precursor to Kelo ?, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1041, 1052
(describing the Kelo homeowners' brief as asking the Court to "modify existing law"
or "restrict prior interpretations"); Ely, supra note 241, at 854 (suggesting that the
grant of certiorari in Kelo might signal willingness to curb use of eminent domain for
economic development); Mary Massaron Ross, Does County of Wayne v. Hathcock
Signal a Revival of the Public Use Limit to the Taking of Private Property ? 37 URB. LAW. 243,
267 (2005) (writing that in Kelo the Supreme Court can continue its direction or
"shift course," and predicting an "earthquake" if the property owners win); White-
head & Harden, supra note 241, at 82 (arguing that the eminent domain power has
been abused throughout the country, and hoping the Supreme Court uses Kelo to
curb that power); Buckingham, supra note 231, at 1309 (hoping the Supreme Court
will put an outer limit on what is currently a "near plenary" power, and stating that, if
the city wins, "the doctrine of eminent domain will be left largely unchanged");
Michael J. Coughlin, Comment, Absolute Deference Leads to Unconstitutional Governance:
The Need for a New Public Use Rule, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1001, 1003-04 (2005) (discuss-
ing cases, and hoping the Supreme Court will reject the Berman/Midkiff regime and
follow Hathcock instead).
258 Merrill, supra note 253, at 17; see also Salkin & Lucero, supra note 240, at 241
(asking the court to "[c]ontinue" its rational basis review in eminent domain cases
and leave new restrictions to the states); Gallagher, supra note 230, at 1842, 1865-71
(admitting that the Supreme Court "has not yet considered whether economic devel-
opment justifies the use of eminent domain," but arguing that economic develop-
ment was within the public purpose test).
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joyed.259 If governments already enjoyed power to act as New London
had acted, a court decision affirming those actions as legal cannot be
a shift in the law.
After the case was decided, the commentators remained divided
as to whether the Court had reached a wise conclusion, but they re-
mained almost unanimous that it had not reached a new one. Shelly
Ross Saxer wrote that "Kelo did not change the law, but it should
have. '260 To legal historian and property textbook author James W.
Ely, Jr., the decision merely "administered last rites" to an already de-
crepit restriction on eminent domain. 261 Other than the Institute for
Justice, 262 very few voices dissented from the view that Kelo did not
widen the power of eminent domain. 263 Since the Court only applied
the existing test to uphold a condemnation similar to those already
upheld, Kelo might be described as the most misreported, 264 as well as
the most unpopular, case in recent memory.
259 LiorJacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE LJ. 781, 822 n.160 ("Let
us hope that the Court is careful enough to avoid this pitfall.").
260 Shelly Ross Saxer, Thoughts on Kelo v. City of New London, in LAND USE INSTI-
TUTE PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION,
supra note 243, at 79, 81, available at WL SL005 ALI-ABA 79. Saxer has specifically
written on RLUIPA and eminent domain, see Saxer, supra note 78, but she did not
address how Kelo might change her previous analysis.
261 Ely, supra note 7, at 61. Ely was nevertheless unhappy with the decision, be-
cause of its "flawed reasoning" and because it "represented a lost opportunity" to limit
eminent domain power. Id.
262 INST. FOR JUSTICE, Kelo v. City Of New London: What It Means and the Need for
Real Eminent Domain Reform (2005), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/
pdf/Kelo-WhitePaper.pdf. The IFJ argues that even if Kelo did not change the legal
test for eminent domain, it broadened the law by applying the test to more extreme
facts. Id. at 3. The IFJ's argument misses the point that condemnations similar to
those in Kelo have been repeatedly upheld by courts in the past. Perhaps the IFJ's
position was colored by its representation of the homeowners in the case.
263 See supra note 260 and accompanying text; see also David B. Cosgrove, The U.S.
Supreme Court Authorizes Taking of Private Property for Economic Development: New London,
But Old Rules?, ORANGE COUNTY LAw., Sep. 2005, at 42, 44 (discussing "perception"
that Kelo changes the law); David C. Wilkes & John D. Cavallaro, This Land Is Your
Land?, N.Y. ST. BAR J., Oct. 2005, at 10, 12 (arguing that the view that Kelo gives the
government greater eminent domain power is "misguided"). But see Richard A. Ep-
stein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 355, 355-57 (2005) (distinguishing
past eminent domain cases and arguing that Kelo did expand the eminent domain
power). It should be noted that since the case was decided so recently, the scholarly
commentary on it remains somewhat sparse.
264 Erwin Chemerinsky, The End of an Era, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 345, 350 (2005). Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky argues that the "media['s] present[ation of] this case as a dra-
matic change in the law" was erroneous and calls the case the most misreported of the
2005 term. Id.
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Indeed, a plausible argument exists that Kelo narrowed the scope
of eminent domain law. The Court issued unanimous decisions in
Berman and Midkiff, Kelo came down 5-4. A single replacement on the
court could lead to a different result.26 5 Furthermore, while five jus-
tices signed the main opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring
opinion stating that, while he upheld New London's condemnations
under the deferential standard of Berman and Midkiff he would apply
a stricter standard of review in circumstances where the takings
showed "impermissible favoritism" to private parties. 266 Kennedy did
not elaborate on what those circumstances would be or what his test
would look like (the dissent sharply criticized him for this omis-
sion 2 6 7 ), but his concurrence and role as the critical fifth vote suggest
that a city would not want to push its eminent domain power too far
beyond the facts of Kelo for fear of losing Kennedy's vote.268 Both
Kennedy and Stevens stressed that the takings occurred in the context
of a comprehensive redevelopment plan. 269 Both stressed the overall
depressed economy of New London. 270 This factual focus may cast
doubt on whether the Court would approve a condemnation for eco-
nomic development where the city lacked (or ignored) a larger eco-
nomic development plan or executed the condemnation in a less
depressed area.27' The Court even hinted that the 'just compensa-
tion" paid might not be constitutionally just in all cases but said that
issue could not be addressed further because it was not before the
265 The U.S. Senate is aware of this fact, as Supreme Court nominee John Roberts
was questioned by the Judiciary Committee on his view of Kelo. See On Eminent Do-
main, Supreme Court Workload, End of Life and Consistency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at
A28.
266 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2669 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
267 Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
268 The kind of one-to-one forced exchange of property in Cottonwood, where the
church's property is taken to be given to Costco, might be sufficient to trigger Ken-
nedy's stricter test, but one cannot be sure.
269 Id. at 2665 (majority opinion); id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
270 Id. at 2658 (majority opinion); id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Contrast
the depressed economy of New London with the City of Cypress's notorious twenty-
five percent surplus. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
271 See Echeverria, supra note 55, at 10,586 (saying that "most important new limi-
tation" in Kelo is that courts will only grant significant deference to condemnations
when there is a "comprehensive plan"). But see Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'ConnorJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that, while the majority "takes great comfort" in the facts of Kelo,
the facts have no legal significance).
2oo,6] 1693
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Court.2 72 In doing so, the majority expressed a measure of sympathy
with the victims of eminent domain that previous cases lacked.
273
One need not accept the argument that Kelo narrowed the mean-
ing of "public use." Berman and Midkiff involved a large plan, so the
focus on the plan may be nothing new. The reference to compensa-
tion may be a rhetorical scrap. But the existence of an argument that
Kelo narrowed the Public Use Clause weakens the claim that Kelo ex-
panded the Clause.
But it is the Kelo dissenters who provide the strongest proof that
Kelo did not change the law. The dissenters claimed that the decision
"significantly expand[ed] the meaning of 'public use,"' 2 7 4 but the
rest of the dissent belies that claim. Justice O'Connor, who authored
the principle dissent (Justice Thomas also filed his own dissent), also
wrote Midkiff and thus found herself trying to work around a case she
had written. O'Connor argued that Kelo departed from precedent be-
cause past cases found a public purpose only when the government
was acting to combat some harm, while in Kelo it was trying to pro-
mote the good of economic development. 275 The majority needed
only a footnote to refute her argument: it observed that there was
nothing harmful with the particular property condemned in Berman
and nothing inherently harmful about the land condemned in the
turn-of-the-century mining cases.
276
The majority did not add, although it could have, that Kelo could
be framed as a case where the government was combating the harm of
economic depression. Just as Mr. Berman's particular store was not
blighted, but the neighborhood was, Ms. Kelo's home may not have
been harmful, but the depressed economy harmed the entire area.
Even if Justice O'Connor's distinction between government actions
which attack harms and actions which promote goods was valid with
272 Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2668 n.21 (majority opinion).
273 Justice Stevens' hint that compensation may not always be just is a far cry from
Justice Douglas's sneer that "[i]f those who govern the District of Columbia decide
the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
274 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
275 Id. O'Connor's analysis, and especially her view that eminent domain can be
used to remove harmful property use but not to promote a beneficial use, substan-
tially resembles the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). The resemblance is probably not coincidental. See
Merrill, supra note 253, for an explanation, given before oral argument in Kelo, of
how the Supreme Court could follow Hathcock if it wished to rule for the homeowners
without directly overruling Berman and Midkiff
276 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.16 (majority opinion).
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respect to eminent domain, it has been criticized elsewhere as a
vague, easily manipulated judicial standard.
277
To her credit, Justice O'Connor admits that her dissent cannot
be squared with the language in Berman and Midkiff that equates the
eminent domain power with the sovereign's police power. 278 She dis-
misses this language as "errant" and "unnecessary to the specific hold-
ings" 279 of those prior cases; she must, as that language if taken
literally compels Kelo's result. Yet the language she dismisses from
Midkiff as "errant" came from her own pen. O'Connor may well have
second thoughts about the wisdom of her decision in Midkiff; that is
not remarkable, as Supreme Court Justices have changed their minds
before. 2 0 More remarkable is her claim that, essentially, she did not
mean what she wrote literally when she wrote it. Still, O'Connor's
candid admission that a different outcome in Kelo would have re-
quired dismissing language from past cases refutes any claim that Kelo
significantly expanded the scope of the Public Use Clause.
28'
Kelo did not open the door to a Brave New World of unlimited
eminent domain powers. At worst, it alerted the public to the breadth
of an existing power. At best, it affirmed settled precedent. The ma-
jority opinion, academic commentary, and, most of all, the dissent,
prove that Kelo did not change the law of eminent domain. Kelo
merely held that economic development satisfied the Court's deferen-
tial test for condemnation under the Public Use Clause. RLUIPA re-
quires that the government satisfy the compelling interest test before
it condemns religious land, and Kelo never even hinted that economic
development would pass this much more demanding standard.
277 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in
the eye of the beholder.").
278 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
279 Id.
280 Justice Byron White, who voted with the majority in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), and harshly criticized the decision twenty years later, Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766-74 (1985) (White, J., con-
curring), is one of the most notable examples.
281 Justice Thomas's dissent takes an even more restrictive view of the Public Use
Clause and openly advocates reversing Berman and Midkiff as inconsistent with the
original meaning of the Clause. Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2667 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
While his solitary dissent represents the view of a minority within a minority, his view
that the standard adopted by Berman is "boundlessly broad" and should be reconsid-
ered offers even more evidence that Kelo is no more than an application of existing
law. Id. at 2682.
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CONCLUSION
This Note asked whether church leaders' fears of being targeted
for economically motivated condemnation following Kelo were reason-
able. In light of history, those concerns are not irrational. Govern-
ments have attempted to use eminent domain to transfer tax-exempt
church property to an owner who will pay more taxes. However, this
Note's analysis suggests that the leaders' fears are exaggerated. Kelo
may motivate a few governments to try and seize religious land in an
effort to fatten their wallets, but Kelo should not help those govern-
ments succeed.
RLUIPA requires that a government land use regulation which
substantially burdens a person's or a congregation's free exercise of
their religion must serve a compelling governmental interest and fol-
low the least restrictive means. RLUIPA's definition of land use regu-
lation includes eminent domain actions. Condemnation substantially
burdens free exercise. Before Kelo, economic development was not a
compelling governmental interest. Therefore, before Kelo, churches
were protected from condemnation for economic development by
RLUIPA. Notwithstanding the protests of the dissenters and the pop-
ular firestorm, Kelo wrought no change in the law of eminent domain.
Economic development was a permitted, but not a compelling,
interest before Kelo. It remains a permitted, but not compelling, in-
terest after Kelo. Therefore, RLUIPA should still protect churches and
other religious land users in Kelo's wake from condemnations moti-
vated by economic development or tax revenue. Church leaders need
not cringe at the sound of bulldozers; because of RLUIPA, they and
their congregations are far from defenseless.
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